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This article uncovers a strong link between scientific and engineering publications on the 
one hand, and growth volatility on the other: growth volatility is significantly lowered by 
a country’s ability to publish more scientific and engineering journal articles. This link is 
strongest among the high-income developed countries, where we find causality running 
from scientific research output to growth volatility. The evidence suggests that scientific 
research fuels technological progress and productivity growth, which support population 
increase, diversification, and stable economic growth. The key finding of this article is 
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1.  Introduction 
Developing countries regularly experience large swings of economic activities. The 
traditional notion that some countries never experience any growth does not accurately 
describe the real world. Even the poorest countries experience periods with growth spurts, 
which, for a short time, raise hopes that the countries will catch up with the rest of the 
world. However, then their miraculous growth spurts decline and hopes of reducing 
poverty in the world are dashed. These volatile patterns of growth in developing countries 
have been well documented by Easterly et al. (1993), Pritchett (2000) and Jones and 
Olken (2005). 
The human costs of volatile growth are enormous. In addition to the vast increase in 
the number of unemployed poor, severe recessions hit those who are most vulnerable 
especially hard. Paxson and Schady (2004) analyze the impact of the profound 1988-92 
recession in Peru on infant mortality and show that there was an increase of about 2.5 
percentage points in the infant mortality rate for children born in late 1989 and 1990, 
implying that about 17,000 more children died than would have in the absence of the 
recession. Cruces and Wodon (2003) find that households without the means to diversify 
their income sources suffered more than others from the Argentina's economic collapse 
of 2002. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 shows the extent of growth variations for countries of different income 
levels. It shows that low-income developing countries in 1960 experienced more 
diversified growth rates for the past 40 years than those of the high-income developed 
countries, whose growth rates are highly stable at around 2 percent over time. Both 
Botswana (BWA) and Congo Democratic Republic (ZAR), for example, shared similar 
income levels in 1960, but Botswana achieved an impressive annual growth rate of 6.9 
percent for the past 40 years compared to -2.5 percent for Congo Democratic Republic. In 
Table 1, we show the differences in the variance of growth rates between high-income 
developed countries and the rest of the world over time. Table 1 highlights an important 
observation about growth volatility in the past 40 years: the rest of the world consistently 
experienced growth volatility that is roughly three to four times higher than that of high-
income developed countries. What causes a country’s growth to be so much more volatile? 
1 
(Table 1 around here) 
This paper examines a basic determinant of growth volatility: scientific research 
as a natural component of technological progress. We believe that much of the observed 
difference in growth volatility between high-income developed and low-income 
developing countries can be attributed to country differences in the ability to innovate 
and engage in sustained technological progress. High-income countries, with stronger 
institutional quality and greater financial resources, are able to invest heavily in research 
and development (R&D), which not only expands their scientific knowledge frontier, but 
also transforms scientific knowledge into technology and practical applications, which 
develop new and better products or processes. The outcomes of such research combined 
to increase the technological capability of the high-income countries. 
The mechanisms through which technological progress affects growth volatility 
need to be considered. First, technological progress is an important factor in the growth 
equation: technological progress increases growth, even holding all other inputs 
unchanged. Higher growth, in turn, is associated with lower volatility.
1  Thus, 
technological progress impacts indirectly on volatility through its effects on growth. 
Second, increasing the size of a population increases the level of diversification, but the 
size of a population is kept in check by the availability of resources in the country.
2 In the 
Malthusian model, the availability of land is the limiting factor for population increase. 
Without additional land and given the state of technology, the economy can only support 
a certain population size at any given time. However, when technological progress occurs, 
the size of population increases and the economy becomes more diversified, leading to a 
more stable economy.
3   
(Figure 2 and 3 around here) 
                                                 
1 See Ramey and Ramey (1995) who find a robust negative association between growth and volatility of 
growth in the OECD countries and in a sample of 92 non-OECD countries. Similarly, Martin and Rogers 
(2000) find that standard deviation of annual growth rates is negatively correlated with long-run growth for 
a panel of industrialized countries. For a critical review of the literature on this linkage, see Döpke (2004). 
2 Population increases can exhaust natural resources and lead to the collapse of the society. De la Croix and 
Dottori (2008) use a model of population race to account for the tragedy of the Easter Island.  
3 Since the nature of technology is non-rivalry, high population spurs technological progress. Kremer (1993) 
shows that historically, among societies with no technological contact, those with larger initial populations 
have had faster technological progress and population growth. 
2 
We can visually examine the correlation between scientific research output and 
growth volatility in Figure 2 and 3. Figure 2 plots the average standard deviation of 
growth in GDP per capita against the average (logarithmic) number of science and 
engineering (S&E) publications per (million) capita for all 171 countries in the sample. 
The diagram shows that, on average, the standard deviation of growth declines as the 
number of S&E publications increases. Clearly, scientific research output does not 
explain all the variations in growth volatility in Figure 2, especially in countries with 
relatively few S&E publications. Bangladesh (BGD), for example, achieved a 0.9 percent 
standard deviation of growth even though it produced an average of only 1.2 S&E 
publications per million of population per.
4   In contrast, Figure 3 shows that the 
correlation between scientific research output and growth volatility is much stronger for 
high-income countries. The linear regression line in Figure 3 has a simple R-square of 
0.244, indicating that 24.4 percent of the total variations in growth volatility can be 
explained by S&E publications alone. The upshot, as indicated by Figure 2 and 3, is that 
there exists a strong association between scientific research output and growth volatility 
for the high-income and possibly middle-income countries, but this association somehow 
vanishes for low-income countries.  
In this article, we hypothesize that slow but steady population increases in high-
income developed countries are supported by the creation of new industries and 
employment opportunities from sustained technological progress. A larger population, in 
turn, not only spurs further technological progress, but also gives rise to a more 
diversified economy. In contrast, for low-income developing countries with little 
technological progress, the Malthusian prediction of “positive check” takes place, where 
high population growth is coupled with high death rate, and an economy that is highly 
dependent on one industry or even one commodity. Hence, a larger population may or 
                                                 
4 One of the factors not directly addressed in this article is technology transfers from the developed to 
developing countries. Technology transfers can be an important channel for developing countries to 
achieve stable growth, as shown by the example of the development of garment industries in Bangladesh. 
Presently, garment industries account for nearly 80 percent of Bangladesh’s hard-currency earnings from 
exports and employ as many as 1.8 million workers. The beginning of garment industries in Bangladesh in 
April 1980 owes to a joint venture company with the Daewoo Corporation of South Korea, which is a 
major world textile producer. Daewoo trained workers from the joint venture company in return for 
royalties and sales commissions to Daewoo (Easterly, 2002, p. 147). If trade is a proxy indicator of 
technology transfers for low-income countries, our results show some evidence that low-income countries 
tend to have more stable growth with increasing trade (see Table 4, Column 5). 
3 
may not lead to a more stable economy. What is important is whether the population in 
question has the technological means to diversify.
5  
(Figure 4 and 5 around here) 
If technological progress supports increasing population, then scientific research, 
a natural component of technological progress, should be positively correlated with 
population size. This is indeed the case in Figure 4, where population size is plotted 
against S&E publications per (million) capita for the high-income countries. Figure 4 
shows that the more S&E publications, the larger the population size. The regression line 
has a simple R-square of 0.40, meaning 40 percent of the total variations in population 
size can be explained by S&E publications alone in high-income countries. By contrast, if 
we plot the same graph for the low-income developing countries, we see hardly any 
correlation between population size and S&E publications per (million) capita in Figure 5. 
It appears that the low-income developing countries have not yet reached the level of 
technological capacity necessary to support population increases and diversification. 
The direction of causation between technological progress and growth volatility 
need to be considered. Although we focus on the effects of technological progress on 
growth volatility in this paper, the reverse causation from growth volatility to 
technological progress cannot be discounted. It can be argued that the effect of volatility 
of the economic system reflects negatively on the level of technological progress by 
making returns to R&D investments more variable. Consequently, a more stable 
economy attracts more R&D investments, which increase the level of technological 
progress, and further reduces volatility via the channels mentioned above. We use the 
Granger causality framework, which has endured the test of time because of its strong 
intuitive appeal, to assess the causal relationship between technological progress and 
growth volatility. Our empirical results show that once we control for other important 
variables affecting growth volatility and technological progress, the direction of causation 
is unambiguously running from technological progress to growth volatility, rather than 
being the other way around or bi-directional. 
                                                 
5 Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) offer an explanation for low-income countries’ growth volatility. They 
argue that the desire to avoid highly risky investments slows down capital accumulation, and the inability 
to diversify idiosyncratic risk introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process. The typical 
development pattern will consist of a lengthy period of "primitive accumulation" with highly variable 
output.  
4 
A preview of the results of this study shows that the link between scientific 
research output and growth volatility is indeed robust, despite using different samples, 
estimators and control variables. Low-income developing countries, on average, 
published roughly only one percent of the average number of S&E articles (per million of 
population per year) of the high-income developed countries.
6 Our estimates from the 
fixed-effects panel estimations indicate that if the low-income developing countries 
increase their S&E publications to reach just five percent of the publication level of the 
high-income developed countries (18.1), their volatility, on average, would roughly be 
reduced by 2.4 standard deviations, which is a substantial reduction in volatility given 
that their average volatility for the period 1980-2004 is 3.6 standard deviations.
7 Also, we 
find evidence to support the hypothesis that increasing population size has different 
effects on growth volatility, depending on the level of technological progress. Increasing 
population size reduces growth volatility in high-income developed countries, where 
scientific research is substantial. However, this effect is exactly opposite in the low-
income developing countries, where scientific research is negligible. 
This article contributes to the literature by clarifying the nature of technological 
progress on macroeconomic volatility. On the one hand, technological progress may have 
a destabilizing effect on the economy by changing the industrial structure and 
Schumpeterian creative destruction. On the other, as this article argues, technological 
progress may have a stabilizing effect on the economy through convergence of income, 
population increases and diversification of the industrial portfolio of a country. Thus, the 
results of the present study help us identify the role of technological progress in affecting 
macroeconomic volatility. Another contribution of the present study is that we use 
scientific research output in S&E publications as a measure of technological progress, 
rather than the usual TFP growth, which can be associated with GDP growth by 
construction. Indeed, we are unaware of other studies that examine the effects of 
                                                 
6 Low-income developing countries published an average of 3.1 S&E articles per million of population per 
year compared to the average of 362.7 publications per million of population per year for the high-income 
developed countries over the period 1980-2004. 
7 This is calculated using the estimate from the whole world sample in the fixed-effects panel estimation of 
the full model. The estimate is -0.486, indicating a 0.00486 reduction in standard deviation for every 
percentage point increase in S&E publications. 
5 
scientific research on growth volatility, especially in using S&E publications as a 
measure of technological progress.
8  
The organization of this article is as follows: Section 2 discusses previous studies 
relevant to the topic of technological progress and growth volatility. Section 3 briefly 
describes recent trends in scientific research in different parts of the world and gives the 
rationale for using S&E publications as a proxy measure of technological progress. 
Section 4 discusses the construction of the dataset, and the different samples used in the 
estimations. Section 5 discusses the results obtained from fixed-effects panel estimations 
of the baseline and full models, including those of sensitivity checks. Section 6 presents 
the Granger causality framework and discusses the estimation results obtained from this 
framework. Section 7 summarizes and makes some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Previous Studies  
The idea that technological progress has a stabilizing effect on the economy is not a new 
one. In 1930, Keynes argued in his essay: Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren 
that the absence of modern technology was responsible for the large ups and downs of the 
standard of living from the earliest times on record to industrialization in the middle of 
1700s. More recently, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) provide a theory of technological 
diversification to explain why GDP is so much more volatile in low-income countries. In 
their model, production makes use of different input varieties, which are subject to 
imperfectly correlated shocks. The role of technological progress is to increase the 
number of varieties, raising average productivity. Also, the expansion in the number of 
varieties lowers the volatility of output because it provides diversification benefits against 
variety-specific shocks. Another study by Leung, Tang and Groenewold (2006) builds a 
simple growth model with endogenous productivity growth and rent-seeking efforts to 
account for the negative relationship between growth volatility and technological 
progress.  
On the empirical side, we find only a small number of previous studies that 
examine the specific role of technological progress on growth volatility. A study by 
                                                 
8 Kerr (forthcoming, 2008) uses ethnic linkage in scientists across different countries to look at the effects 
of scientific output on trade, employment and productivity growth. 
6 
Easterly and Levine (2001) finds that total factor productivity (TFP) growth, a proxy for 
technological progress, accounts for a substantial inter-temporal and cross-sectional 
variation in growth. Tang, Groenewold and Leung (forthcoming) find that technological 
progress is an important stabilizing force of growth volatility and that at least part of the 
stabilizing force of technological progress originates from strong institutions. Similarly, 
Tang (2002) shows cross-country evidence of a link between growth volatility and TFP 
growth. A study by Jones and Olken (2005), which uses the growth accounting 
framework to decompose growth and a time-series technique to identify the timing of 
growth takeoffs and collapses, finds that productivity growth (or the Solow residual) is 
primarily responsible for both growth takeoffs and collapses in a large number of 
countries. 
 
3.  Scientific Research and S&E Publications
9 
High-income developed countries around the world spend an enormous amount of 
resources on scientific research every year.
10 In the US, for example, R&D spending was  
approximately US$292 billion in 2003, which was equivalent to 2.7 percent of its annual 
GDP. This ranks the US as the fifth most R&D intensive country in the world, following 
Israel (4.9 percent), Sweden (4.3 percent), Finland (3.5 percent), and both Japan and 
Iceland (3.1 percent). Even less-wealthy, fast-growing developing countries increased 
rapidly their R&D during the last decade. China, for example, has become the world’s 
third-largest R&D performer, spending $84.6 billion on R&D in 2003. Over the period 
1990-2003, China’s growth in R&D expenditure averaged 17 percent per annum, 
compared to 4 to 5 percent average annual growth for the US, the European Union and 
Japan. On the whole, less-wealthy developing countries’ share of world’s R&D increased 
from 7 percent to 16 percent over the period 1990-2003.
11  
                                                 
9 Information in this section is taken mostly from Science and Engineering Indicators, National Science 
Board (various years). 
10 The term ‘science’ is used broadly to refer to fields of science such as computer science, life science, 
earth science, physical science, ocean science and social science. 
11 The majority of R&D spending across countries has been used on development of new and improved 
goods, services and processes, while basic and applied research account for less than half of the total R&D 
spending. The US, for example, performed $187.3 billion of development (60 percent), $58.4 billion of 
basic research (18.7 percent), and $66.4 billion of applied research (21.3 percent). In China, despite its 
rapid increase in R&D in the last decade, basic research accounts for only 6 percent of its total R&D 
spending, reflecting China’s emphasis of short-term economic development. Similarly, for other high-
7 
S&E publications refer to the total number of articles, notes and reviews 
published in a slowly expanding set of world’s most influential scientific and engineering 
journals tracked by Thompson Institute for Scientific Information in the Science Citation 
Index (SCI) and Social Science Citation Index (SSCI).
12  SCI and SSCI give good 
coverage of a core set of internationally recognized peer-reviewed scientific journals, 
albeit with some English-language bias. Also, journals of regional or local importance 
may not be covered, which may lead to some bias against countries with a small and 
applied science base. The number of journals covered by SCI/SSCI was 4,458 in 1988, 
4,601 in 1993, 5,084 in 1998, and 5,315 in 2003. The number of S&E publications 
covered by SCI/SSCI grew from approximately 466,000 in 1988 to nearly 700,000 in 
2003, an increase of 50 percent.  
We use the (logarithmic) number of S&E publications, which is a flow variable, 
as a measure of technological progress. Using S&E publications for measuring 
technological progress has the following merits. First, publication is a norm in 
disseminating and validating research results. Major scientific discoveries and 
breakthroughs are almost always published in influential science and technical journals, 
whereas patents are predominantly used for minor improvements and modifications of 
existing products and techniques.
13 Second, publication is crucial for career advancement 
for researchers in most scientific fields. Third, S&E publications are most commonly 
used to measure research output in previous empirical studies in the area (see, for 
example, Crespi and Geuna, 2008). Fourth, S&E publications are increasingly cited by 
patents, indicating a close linkage between science and technology (the average citations 
                                                                                                                                                 
performing Asian economies such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korean and Japan, basic research accounts 
for 15 percent or less of total R&D. Development is predominately funded and performed by industry. 
Microsoft, for example, spent around $6.6 billion in 2006 on development, while IBM and Intel spent $6 
billion each, and Cisco Systems and Hewlett-Packard around $4 billion. Most of this money was spent on 
making small incremental improvements and getting new ideas to market fast. In the US, industry 
performed 90.2 percent of development with the rest of development performed by federal agencies and 
universities in 2004. 
12  More detailed information on how the S&E publications are counted among different countries is 
contained in Appendix A. 
13 The development of “Turbo Codes” gives a good example of the importance of S&E publications as a 
measure of scientific research. The development of “Turbo Codes” was a fundamental breakthrough in 
electrical engineering for error correction in data communication, and it provides a scientific method for 
modern applications such as digital television, 3G mobile telephone and deep-space communication. The 
technology, which was never patented, was developed in 1993 by a team of French researchers and was 
published in the Proceedings of IEEE International Communications Conference. 
8 
of S&E publications per patent increased from roughly 0.5 to 2 between 1987 and 2004). 
Fifth, data on S&E publications are collected homogeneously for all countries and from 
reliable sources. Sixth, there is no possible artificial relationship between technological 
progress and growth volatility when S&E publications, as opposed to TFP growth, is 
used to measure technological progress. Seventh, article count is a constituent factor in 
many country technology indices. 
However, as mentioned above, the disadvantage of using S&E publications is that 
English-speaking countries may be over-represented. The significance of this bias can be 
checked by using a sub-sample of non-English speaking countries. As will be shown, the 
negative relationship between S&E publications and growth volatility remains even in the 
sub-sample of non-English speaking countries. 
 
4.  Data 
This article uses all available data on S&E publications from 1980 to 2004 to construct 
the main dataset (the whole world). This unbalanced panel dataset has 627 observations 
from 171 countries. The panel is unbalanced because countries have missing data on S&E 
publications over the sample period. Observations in the dataset are averages over each 
five-year interval of 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, and 2000-2004. On average, 
each country has approximately 3.7 five-year intervals of data. The justification for using 
five-year intervals is that cross-country averages of a long time span, say 10 to 20 years, 
are far too long for capturing instability and also an impediment to the study of causality. 
On the other hand, annual data are too short in duration to reflect the underlying factors. 
For these reasons, we settle on five-year, non-overlapping intervals. 
The dataset for the whole world is further divided into 7 sub-samples. The first 
sub-sample is called non-English speaking countries, which consists of those countries in 
the world where English is not an official language. Moreover, we divide the dataset into 
three different income groups according to the World Bank’s classifications. High-
income countries are those countries with a gross national income (GNI) of US$11,116 or 
more in 2006, middle-income countries with a GNI between US$906 and US$11,115, 
and low-income countries with a GNI of US$905 or less. We further divide the dataset 
into three different geographic locations according to the World Bank’s classifications: 
9 
European and Central Asian countries, East Asian and Pacific countries, and sub-Saharan 
African countries. Appendix B lists all the countries in the samples with their 
corresponding income group and key country data (averaged over the entire sample 
period). 
The key right-hand-side variable of our regressions is the (logarithmic) number of 
S&E publications per million of population per year. S&E publications refer to the 
number of articles published annually from 1980 to 2004 for each of the 171 countries. 
The raw data indicates that, on average, a country publishes roughly 3,000 articles per 
year over the sample period. The top five countries in article counts are the US, Japan, 
UK, Germany and France. In this group, the US led the rest of countries significantly 
with an average article count of 180,011 publications per year. On the other hand, 
Antigua, Comoros and Dominica had the least number of publications, averaging no 
more than one publication per year. We divided S&E publications by the population (in 
millions) in order to purge the effect of population size on S&E publications. The 
resulting data show that, on average, a country publishes roughly 100 articles per million 
people per year over the sample period. The top ten countries, in order, are Israel (1033), 
Sweden (963), Switzerland (960), Denmark (780), Canada (747), Finland (713), UK 
(706), US (699), Australia (677), and Netherland (668).  
The dependent variable in our regressions is growth volatility. In the literature, the 
standard deviation of per annum growth rates of real GDP per capita is a widely-used 
measure of growth volatility. For example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Martin and 
Rogers (2000) both use the standard deviation of GDP growth as a measure of volatility 
in their cross-country studies of the relationship between business-cycle volatility and 
growth. Other studies use the interquartile range (the range from the 20th percentile to the 
80th percentile of growth), which is less sensitive to outliers and noise in the data, but 
does not capture any volatility between the two extreme points of the range. In practice, 
the two measures are highly correlated. Hence, we use the standard deviation of per 
annum growth rates of real GDP per capita. The average standard deviation across 171 
countries is roughly 3.4 percent, indicating that with 68 percent chances, a country’s 
growth rate in a given year would be between plus or minus 3.4 percent from its mean, 
given the growth rate is normally distributed. The mean GDP growth by country is 1.3 
10 
percent. Thus, there is a 68 percent chance that the growth rate of a country would be 
between -2.2 and 4.7 percent. 
  In this study, we include a battery of control variables in our regressions to check 
for the robustness of our regression results. Our goal is to follow closely the current 
literature in choosing the control variables that have been identified as important in 
explaining growth volatility. These control variables are initial income, institutional 
quality (as measured by the degrees of institutional constraint imposed on executive 
power), GDP growth, total population, manufacturing share of GDP, domestic credit 
(financial development), trade share of GDP (openness), inflation rate, and government 
expenditure. Justification for including each of these control variables will be discussed 
in detail in the next section. Table 2 shows, by country, the basic summary statistics and 
correlation matrix of all the variables used in the study. The basic summary statistics 
include mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and the number of countries for 
each variable. To save space, measurements and sources for the control variables are 
discussed in details in Appendix A. 
(Table 2 around here) 
  The correlation matrix in Table 2 shows the bivariate correlation coefficients 
among the variables. These correlation coefficients are similar to results obtained from 
simple cross-country regressions over the entire sample period. First, research output 
measured by S&E publications is negatively and significantly correlated with growth 
volatility. This is also true for initial income, executive constraint, GDP growth, 
population and manufacturing share of GDP. We, however, do not detect any significant 
correlation between domestic credit (financial development), trade share of GDP 
(openness), inflation rate and government expenditure on the one hand, and growth 
volatility on the other. Thus, growth tends to be more stable with higher research output, 
initial income, executive constraint, GDP growth, population size, and the manufacturing 
share of GDP. Second, research output is positively and significantly correlated with 
initial income, executive constraint, GDP grow, manufacturing share of GDP and 
government expenditure, but is negatively and significantly correlated with the inflation 
11 
rate. In general, correlation coefficients in Table 2 are consistent with our expectations 
and the results of cross-country studies in the literature.
14 
  The simple correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 do not control for the 
effects of omitted variables and reverse causation that may be responsible for the 
observed relationship between the variables in question. To deal with misspecification 
errors, we opt for the fixed-effects panel estimation, which offers a stringent check on 
omitted variables. To deal with the issue of endogeneity, we adopt the Granger causality 
framework. Both of these econometric techniques and their results will be discussed in 
turn in the next two sections. 
 
 
5.  Fixed-Effects Panel Estimations: Models, Results and Sensitivity Checks 
5.1  The Baseline Model and Results 
We implement country and time fixed-effects estimations by introducing a dummy 
variable for each individual country and time period in the samples. On the one hand, the 
country fixed-effects control for all unobservable time-invariant country specific factors 
and are appropriate when these unobservable time-invariant factors are believed to be 
correlated with technological progress. On the other hand, the time fixed-effects control 
for all unobservable time specific factors that are the same for all countries. Consequently, 
the fixed-effects panel estimations offer a stringent check against misspecification errors 
and give a reliable estimate of the link between growth volatility and technological 
progress. 
The fixed-effects panel econometric model is as follows.  
 
(1)   ( ) ( ) t i i t i t i t i u a x Sci , 1 , 1 , , + + + = − − θ β σ  
  
where the subscripts i and t are country and time indexes,  t i, σ  is the standard deviation of 
annual growth rates of real GDP per capita and  ,1 it Sci −  is the logarithmic number of S&E 
publications per million of population lagged one period. θ  is a vector of coefficients. 
                                                 
14 In particular, we find that GDP growth significantly decreases with higher volatility and inflation, but 
increases with higher executive constraint. These results are consistent with results from empirical studies 
in the growth literature. 
12 
1 , − t i x  is a vector of time-variant control variables lagged one period,  i a is a vector of 
unobserved country and time fixed-effects, and  it u   is an idiosyncratic error. The key 
parameter of interest in this study is β , which links technological progress to growth 
volatility. We expect β  to be negative and statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. 
(Table 3 around here) 
The results of country and time fixed-effects panel estimations for the baseline 
model are presented in Table 3. The baseline model regresses growth volatility on S&E 
publications and initial income only without including other time-variant control 
variables. Initial income is added to the regressions to control for the effect of income 
levels on growth volatility. It should be noted that the time-invariant mean income 
differences across countries have already been controlled for by the country fixed-effects. 
Thus, the effect of initial income in the regressions represents any effect that is above the 
mean initial income on growth volatility. The estimation results for the whole world are 
presented first, followed by those of other seven sub-samples in Table 3.  
In Table 3, the estimation results show that out of the eight different samples, five 
of them give a negative estimate, which is statistically significant at the one percent level 
for S&E publications. The whole world, non-English speaking countries, high-income 
countries, middle-income countries, and Europe and central Asia all show that scientific 
research output, as measured by S&E publications, has a statistically negative effect on 
growth volatility. For example, the estimated effect of S&E publications on growth 
volatility for the middle-income countries is -0.655, which is statistically significantly at 
the one percent level. Thus, for the middle-income countries, for every one percent 
increase in S&E publications, growth volatility is estimated to decrease by about 0.007 
standard deviations. To put it in context, if Thailand, a middle-income country that 
publishes about 8 articles per million of population annually, increases its publications to 
reach the mean publication level of the middle-income countries, which is about 26 
articles per million of population annually, then Thailand’s volatility in growth would be 
reduced by about 1.6 standard deviations. Thailand, which was the origin of the 1997 
13 
Asian financial crises, with an average volatility of 3.1 standard deviations, would be able 
to reduce its volatility by an half. 
Table 3 indicates that the negative effect of S&E publications on growth volatility 
is statistically significant at the one percent level even for the non-English speaking 
countries. Consequently, we are confident that the potential bias favoring English 
speaking countries in article count is not responsible for the observed link between 
scientific research output and growth volatility. Table 3 also shows that scientific 
research output does not appear to affect growth volatility at all for samples of low-
income countries, East Asia and Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa. Their S&E publication 
estimates are positive but statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. As 
discussed before, low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa have minimal 
technological progress, and conduct little, if any, scientific research. Thus, the estimation 
results are consistent with our expectations that the number of S&E publications of these 
two samples is too small to have an effect on volatility. However, it is somewhat puzzling 
to find that East Asia and Pacific, which include some of the fastest growing economies 
in the world, show an insignificant relationship between growth volatility and S&E. First, 
East Asian economies had relied heavily on technology transfers for acquiring much of 
their technological know-how in the initial stage of their development. Second, the results 




5.2  The Full Model and Sensitivity Checks 
While we focus on the level of technological progress as a major determinant of growth 
volatility in this article, other variables can also play a substantial role in explaining the 
volatility of growth. In this section, we add a number of time-variant control variables to 
the baseline model to check for the robustness of our earlier results and conclusions. The 
recent literature is closely followed in selecting the control variables, which will be 
discussed in turn before estimation results of the full model are presented. 
                                                 
15 Young (1994), among others, argues that the spectacular postwar growth of East Asia can be attributed 
almost entirely to these economies’ rapid growth in factor inputs rather than in total productivity growth.  
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In the literature, it has been found that volatility tends to reduce growth. However, 
the link can also be bi-directional since a steady pace of technological progress sustains a 
high growth rate and a stable economy. In other words, growth is a channel through 
which technological progress affects volatility.
16 If this is the case, then adding GDP 
growth in the regressions should reduce the magnitude and significance of S&E 
publications in explaining volatility. As a result, we can assess the importance of the 
growth channel by measuring the amount of reduction of the estimated coefficient of 
S&E publications after it is added to the regressions. 
Institutional quality is another variable that has been studied extensively in the 
growth literature. A study by Acemoglu, et al. (2003) finds that there is a strong link 
between institutions and growth volatility and that neither standard macroeconomic 
variables nor political crises are the mediating channels through which institutions affect 
volatility. We believe that technological progress is an important channel through which 
institutional quality affects volatility. Better protection against expropriation risk from the 
state and more institutional constraints on chief executive to prevent abuse of power help 
increase investments in both physical and human capital. Consequently, a better 
institutional quality stimulates a higher level of R&D investment and technological 
progress, which eventually leads to a more stable economy. Thus, while a measure of 
institutional quality by itself is expected to affect volatility significantly in the regressions, 
its negative impact would be substantially reduced by the addition of S&E publications. 
Current literature points to changes in productivity growth rather than factor 
accumulation as a major determinant of growth reversals and accelerations (Jones and 
Olken, 2005). Reallocation across sectors, in particular, the higher-productivity 
manufacturing sectors, is believed to be the mechanism through which productivity 
growth takes place. We, thus, add the share of manufacturing sector in GDP to the 
regressions to assess the extent to which the effects of technological progress on volatility 
are channeled through changes in manufacturing sectors. 
At the beginning of this article, we discuss in detail the effects of increasing 
population size on volatility. An increasing population, when it is accompanied by 
technological progress, is believed to increase the level of diversification and reduce 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu for suggesting this channel on an earlier draft of this paper.  
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volatility. Mobarak (2005) finds that an increasing population, which is used as a proxy 
for diversification, significantly reduces volatility in his empirical study of the effect of 
democracy on volatility and growth. However, an increasing population can also be 
destabilizing if it is not accompanied by technological progress, as is predicted by the 
Malthusian model. Thus, we add total population in the regressions to check the effects of 
changing population size on volatility.  
Although a clear link has not been established in the empirical literature about the 
effects of trade openness on long-run growth, trade openness has been shown to be 
growth promoting in the theoretical literature (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2003; Wacziarg and Welch, 2003; Rodriquez and Rodrik, 2000). Thus, at least in 
theory, one can relate trade to volatility through its effects on growth: trade openness 
promotes growth and thus reduces volatility. In contrast, trade links also imply that 
business cycle fluctuations are transmitted among trading partners, giving rise to a more 
volatile economy. A study by Kose, et al. (2006) finds that countries that are more open 
to trade appear to be able to tolerate higher volatility without adverse consequences for 
long-run growth. Thus, the effects of trade openness on volatility in the regressions are 
uncertain empirically.  
The next control variable we add to the model is financial development. One 
school of thought is that more developed financial systems should imply reduced 
asymmetric information problems, as financial institutions become more capable of 
identifying projects with a higher probability of failure. Thus, more developed financial 
systems reduce volatility by reducing credit market imperfections, which amplify shocks 
to the economy (see, for example, Bacchetta and Caminal, 2000; and Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). Another school of thought believes that financial development reduces 
volatility because it helps firms facing temporary cash flow or net worth problem to 
obtain necessary working capital to finance their operations (see, for example, Caballero 
and Krishnamurty, 2001). Empirical studies by Easterly, et al. (2000); Beck, et al. (2001); 
Ferreira da Silva (2002); and Raddatz (2006), among others, have confirmed the 
stabilizing effect of financial development on the economy. 
  Inflation volatility is an important source of macroeconomic volatility since it 
increases consumption uncertainty and business risk associated with investments. In the 
16 
US, macroeconomic volatility has declined substantially since the middle of 1980s and it 
has been suggested that the US monetary policy plays an important role in reducing 
inflation volatility (McConnell and Pérez-Quirós, 2000). Cecchetti, et al. (2006) find that 
in a broad cross-section of countries, inflation volatility has fallen markedly over the past 
20 years due largely to more efficient monetary policy. We thus add inflation in our 
regressions to account for the effects of changing inflation rates on growth volatility. 
Fiscal stabilization policy can mitigate business cycle fluctuations, which are 
often transmitted among trading partners. Andersen and Spange (2006), for example, 
show in a two country general equilibrium model that there is a welfare case for an active 
fiscal stabilization policy, and that it is larger in the presence of rigid wages. We thus add 
government expenditure in the regressions to consider empirically the effects of changing 
government spending on growth volatility. 
(Table 4 around here) 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the full model, which includes in the 
regressions all the time-variant control variables discussed above, as well as the time-
invariant country and time fixed-effects.
17 First, the results show that S&E publications 
have a negative effect on growth volatility, which is statistically significant at the one and 
five percent levels for the high-income and middle-income countries, respectively. The 
magnitude of these samples’ estimated coefficients for S&E publications is also much 
larger than before the control variables are added (-0.651 versus -1.022 and -0.655 versus 
-0.810). Thus, the result suggests that some control variables (for example, executive 
constraint) affect growth volatility via S&E publications. However, the estimated 
negative effect of S&E publications on growth volatility is no longer statistically 
significant for the samples of the whole world, non-English speaking and Europe and 
Central Asia. The magnitude of these samples’ estimated coefficients for S&E 
publications is also much smaller than before the control variables are added (-0.486 
versus -0.277, -0.543 versus -0.255, and -0.804 versus -0.342). Clearly, the result 
suggests that some of the effects of S&E publications have been channeled to other 
intermediating factors (for example, population) in the full model. 
                                                 
17 Our empirical results include adding control variables independently and sequentially (one by one) to the 
baseline model. These results are too voluminous to report here, but are available upon request. In general, 
the unreported results support the main conclusions of this article.   
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Second, the samples of low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa show a 
positive but statistically insignificant estimate for S&E publications. However, we have 
anticipated this result because the low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa lack the 
necessary technological capability to diversify their production. Third, the estimated 
coefficients for initial income are consistently positive and statistically significant across 
the different samples, indicating that “extra” increases in income above the average 
income over time are destabilizing 
Estimation results in Table 4 show that population increases have different effects 
on growth volatility, which are statistically significant. For high-income countries, 
population increases have a stabilizing (negative) effect on growth volatility, which is 
statistically significant at the five percent level. However, for low-income countries, 
population increases have a destabilizing (positive) effect on growth volatility, which is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. The same contrast is found between 
Europe and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. For Europe and Central Asia, where 
technological capability to diversify is relatively high, population increases reduce 
volatility, but for sub-Saharan Africa, where technological capability to diversify is 
minimal, population increases exacerbate volatility.  
Table 4 shows that GDP growth affects volatility negatively in all but two 
samples. For low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa, GDP growth reduces 
volatility at the five percent significance level. For high-income and middle-income 
countries, GDP growth still affects volatility negatively, but is not statistically significant 
at the conventional levels. On the whole, the evidence appears to confirm the current 
literature on the existence of a negative relationship between growth and volatility. 
In Table 4, financial development is estimated to have a stabilizing (negative) 
effect on volatility for all but two samples. Only the samples of low-income countries and 
sub-Saharan Africa show a positive estimated coefficient for financial development, but 
are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. For the high-income countries, 
financial development reduces volatility at the five percent significance level. The results 
suggest that the relationship between financial development and volatility may be more 
complex than what the current empirical literature concludes. Specifically, there are 
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different effects of financial development on volatility, which may ultimately depend on 
the country’s income or institutional quality (see Acemoglu, et al., 2003). 
Table 4 shows that reducing the inflation rate increases volatility significantly for 
the middle-income and low-income countries. These results seem to suggest that for the 
majority of countries in the world the twin objectives of maintaining steady growth and 
low inflation at the same time are difficult to achieve: lowering inflation comes at a cost 
of disrupting the momentum of growth. 
The estimation results are mixed for the other control variables in Table 4. First, it 
shows that fiscal stabilizing policy reduces volatility consistently across different samples, 
but is effective only for high-income countries. Second, the results for trade openness are 
mixed, although it significantly increases volatility for the middle-income countries. 
Third, for high-income countries, the growth of the manufacturing sector helps reduce 
volatility. Fourth, executive constraint, a measure of institutional quality, has little effect 
on volatility, which is what we expected since most of its effects have been channeled 
through other intermediating factors.  
In sum, the results of fixed-effects panel estimations show that the effect of 
scientific research output measured by S&E publications on growth volatility is negative 
and statistically significant for all samples except low-income countries, sub-Saharan 
Africa and East Asia and Pacific in the baseline model. In the full model, the statistical 
significance for the negative relationship between S&E publications and volatility 
remains for the high-income and middle-income countries, despite adding a battery of 
time-variant control variables, in addition to country and time fixed-effects, to the 
regressions. These results provide vigorous and reliable checks on the relationship 
between scientific research output and growth volatility, suggesting that the negative 
relationship between the two variables is unlikely to be a product of misspecification 
errors. In the next section, we will go beyond the fixed-effects panel estimations to look 
at the issue of causality.  
 
6.  The Granger Causality Framework: Models, Results and Sensitivity Checks 
In this section, the direction of causation between scientific research output and growth 
volatility is examined. We employ the Granger causality framework, which has endured 
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the test of time because of its elegance and strong intuitive appeal. The framework tests 
whether scientific research output “causes” growth volatility or if growth volatility 
“causes” scientific research output over time.  Of course, the causation can be running 
both ways in which case we would see a bi-directional or feedback relationship between 
scientific research output and growth volatility. The following bivariate vector 
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where  t x  and  t y  are growth volatility and S&E publications at time t, respectively. The 
bivariate VAR in equation (1) tests causality by implementing the propositions that, first, 
the future cannot cause the present or the past; second, an event x can only cause  y  if it 
occurs before y ; and third, the prediction of y  can be made more accurate given the 
occurrence of x.  These basic intuitions underline the widely used Granger causality test. 
The Granger causality framework set out above assumes that the cause contains unique 
information about the effect, which is exhaustive and not available elsewhere. If the 
cause and effect are both affected by a third variable, which is not included in the 
information set underlying the Granger causality test, then the test can be rendered 
useless. Consequently, we will include those variables that have been found to affect 
growth volatility directly or indirectly via scientific research output in the last section as a 
control in the Granger causality test.  
  An econometric issue arises when the right-hand-side of the regression includes a 
lagged dependent variable. This is commonly referred to in the econometric literature as 
the dynamic panel problem. It has been shown that parameter estimates will be 
inconsistent and biased unless the time dimension of the panel data is very large. 
Unfortunately, most panel data, including our current data, have substantial sample size 
in the cross-section dimension, whereas the time dimension is often a single-digit 
number. The best solution to deal with dynamic panel problem is still a subject of debate 
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in the econometric literature. However, some recent studies (see, for example, Harris and 
Mátyás, 2004; Kiviet, 1995) that focus on “short and wide” panel data find that the 
instrumental variable approach pioneered by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) performs as 
well as any other alternatives. Consequently, we use this method, which requires first 
differencing all variables and using second-lag differences as instruments. We also follow 
Arellano’s (1989) recommendation by using the twice lagged levels instead of the twice 
lagged first differences as instruments.
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(Table 5 around here) 
The length and frequency of the time lags for the Granger causality framework 
need to be discussed. First, as for the length of the time lags, Granger cautions that ‘using 
data measured over intervals much wider than actual causal lags can also destroy causal 
interpretation’ (Granger, 1987, p. 49). The panel data in this article has five-year periods, 
which is long enough for studying the effects of scientific research output on growth 
volatility, and at the same time short enough to allow us to examine the effects of lagged 
variables and to conduct a Granger causality test. Second, as for the frequency of the time 
lags, given that our panel has only 5 five-year periods and that the twice lagged levels are 
used for the instruments, we can only expand the number of lags to t-2 with substantial 
reduction in the number of observations and few degrees of freedom.
19 Thus, we have no 
choice but to constrain the Granger causality test to one lag. 
In Table 5, we present results for the tests of whether scientific research output 
Granger-causes growth volatility. The test results show that all the estimated coefficients 
for scientific research output are negative, but only those of the high-income countries 
and Europe and Central Asia are statistically significant at the conventional levels. Thus, 
scientific research output Granger-causes growth volatility for the samples of high-
income countries and Europe and Central Asia, but not for the other samples. Table 5 
also shows that last period’s growth volatility does not in general Granger-causes current 
volatility except in the sample of Europe and Central Asia, where a negative inter-
temporal causation is detected.  
                                                 
18 Other empirical studies using Granger causality framework also adopt this approach to deal with the 
dynamic panel problem. See, among others, Campos and Nugent (2003). 
19 The sample size has been reduced substantially due to differencing of the variables and employing twice-
lagged levels as instruments. The whole world sample, for example, has only 285 observations remaining, a 
reduction of more than 50 percent from the original sample of 627 observations. 
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(Table 6 around here) 
In Table 6, we ask the reverse question of whether growth volatility Granger-
causes scientific research output. The test results show that growth volatility does 
Granger-cause scientific research output for the samples of the whole world, non-English 
speaking countries, middle-income countries, and Europe and Central Asia. For these 
samples, the estimated coefficients for growth volatility are negative and statistically 
significant at the conventional levels, suggesting that increasing growth volatility 
Granger-causes scientific research output to decrease. Also, the estimated coefficients for 
scientific research output are positive and statistically significant for all but the samples 
of Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and Pacific, indicating that increasing scientific 
research output this period Granger-causes scientific research output to increase next 
period. 
In sum, Table 5 and 6 combined to give a picture that the direction of causation 
runs uniquely from scientific research output to growth volatility for the sample of high-
income countries. For the samples of the whole world, non-English speaking countries, 
and middle-income countries, the direction of causation runs the other way around, from 
growth volatility to scientific research output. Europe and Central Asia is the only sample 
that shows a bi-directional causation. The remaining samples, low-income countries, East 
Asia and Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa, do not show any signs of Granger causality 
relationship between scientific research output and growth volatility. 
The Granger causality results shown in Table 5 and 6 can be misleading if there is 
a “third” variable affecting volatility and scientific research output. We now deal with 
this potential problem by including in the information set of the test the most likely 
variables that can affect volatility and scientific research output. From the last section, we 
have already identified the variables that affect growth volatility directly or indirectly via 
scientific research output. These variables, in the order of their statistical significance and 
consistency across the different samples, are population, financial development, inflation, 
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and GDP growth. The results of adding these control variables in the Granger causality 
test are reported in Table 7 and 8.
20  
(Table 7 around here) 
Results in Table 7 show that the addition of the control variables in the Granger 
causality test increases the statistical significance of scientific research output in 
explaining growth volatility. Table 7 shows that the coefficients for scientific research 
output are negative and statistically significant for the whole world, high-income 
countries, and middle-income countries. Scientific research output, thus, Granger-causes 
growth volatility for these samples. The remaining samples (except low-income 
countries) show a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient for scientific research 
output. In Table 7, population continues to affect growth volatility differently across 
different samples. For the low-income countries, the effect is positive and statistically 
significant, but for the samples of the whole world, non-English speaking and high-
income countries, the effect is negative but only marginally significant in the case of the 
non-English speaking countries. Table 7 also shows that GDP growth affects volatility 
differently across different samples. For the samples of the whole world, non-English 
speaking countries, middle-income countries and low-income countries, growth increases 
volatility significantly, whereas for the high-income countries, growth reduces volatility 
significantly. 
(Table 8 around here) 
  Table 8 shows the results for testing whether growth volatility Granger-causes 
scientific research output when all the control variables are added. Clearly, all the 
coefficients for growth volatility are not statistically significant at the conventional levels, 
indicating there is little evidence that growth volatility Granger-causes scientific research 
output. There is some evidence, however, that a higher level of scientific research output 
in a current period leads to a higher level of scientific research output in the next period, 
especially for the low-income countries and sub-Saharan Africa where the coefficients 
for scientific research output are both positive and statistically significant. Finally, higher 
growth appears to lead to a higher level of scientific research output as the coefficients 
                                                 
20  To keep the regressions parsimonious, we exclude the other control variables, executive constraint, 
manufacture share of GDP, trade share of GDP, and government expenditure from Table 7 and 8 because 
these variables have little significant and systematic effects on growth volatility, as indicated by Table 4.  
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for GDP growth are both positive and statistically significant for the samples of the whole 
world, non-English speaking countries, and middle-income countries.  
  In sum, adding the control variables to the Granger causality test reinforces the 
earlier results that scientific research output Granger-causes growth volatility. Not only 
do the high-income countries show a uni-directional Granger causation running from 
scientific research output to growth volatility, the whole world and the middle-income 
countries also show the same causation after adding the control variables in the test. 
Moreover, we do not detect any bi-directional Granger causation among the samples. The 
results suggest that once we account for the variables affecting growth volatility and 
scientific research output, the link between scientific research output and growth 
volatility becomes stronger, especially for the high-income countries.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
This article examines why low-income developing countries have suffered much more 
growth volatility than high-income, developed countries for the past 40 years. On average, 
low-income developing countries face three to four times higher volatility than high-
income, developed countries, which subject people living in low-income developing 
countries to constant risk of losing their job, starvation, and even death. What causes 
more volatile in a country’s growth? 
We put forward a simple hypothesis to explain the large difference in growth 
volatility between the high-income and low-income countries: scientific research fuels 
technological progress and productivity growth, which support population increase, 
diversification, and stable economic growth. We use S&E publications to measure 
scientific research output and include all available data from 171 countries between 1980 
and 2004 on S&E publications in our samples. In order to check for consistency in our 
results, the main dataset is further subdivided into seven sub-samples according to 
different income groups, geographic locations and English as an official language.  
We adopt two different econometric frameworks for our investigation: the fixed-
effects panel estimation and Granger causality framework. While fixed-effects panel 
estimation provides stringent checks for misspecification errors, the Granger causality 
framework checks for reverse causation running from growth volatility to scientific 
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research output. Moreover, using the current literature on growth volatility as a guide, we 
add a battery of time-variant control variables to the baseline model to check for 
sensitivity of our results. 
Results from the fixed-effects panel estimations strongly support that there is a 
link between scientific research output and growth volatility: increasing S&E 
publications tends to reduce growth volatility, and this link is especially strong among 
high-income developed countries, but disappears for low-income developing countries. 
Adding a battery of time-variant control variables in the model does not diminish but 
reinforces the role of scientific research output in reducing growth volatility. The results 
also show that population increases significantly reduce growth volatility for high-income 
countries, but for low-income developing countries, population increases exacerbate 
growth volatility. The evidence thus points to the Malthusian notion of population 
increases without technological progress as an important contributing factor for low-
income countries suffering from large fluctuations of growth. 
Results from the Granger causality framework show little evidence of reverse 
causation from growth volatility to scientific research output once we control for the 
potential “third” variables affecting growth volatility and scientific research. Specifically, 
we found strong evidence of uni-directional causation running from scientific research 
output to growth volatility, especially among high-income developed countries. In our 
view, high-income, developed countries provide a compelling case for the stabilizing 
effect of scientific research and technological progress. 
Our results complement the literature that finds institutional quality as an 
important determinant of growth volatility (Acemoglu, et al., 2003). The results show that 
once we account for scientific research output in the model, institutional quality, which is 
measured by executive constraint, is no longer statistically significant in explaining 
growth volatility. Thus, institutional quality works through scientific research and 
technological progress to affect growth volatility: better institutional quality provides 
better incentives for investing in both physical and human capital stocks, which enhances 
scientific research and leads to more technological diversification, steady population 
increase and stable economic growth. 
25 
Overall, the results of this article are consistent with the hypothesis that the lack 
of technological progress is a first-order problem for stabilizing growth: little scientific 
research hinders technological progress and productivity growth, which are essential for 
diversification of industries and creation of new employment opportunities. On the one 
hand, the lack of diversification magnifies the effects of external shocks on the domestic 
economy. On the other hand, population increases destabilize the economy when the 
economy has limited resources and little technological progress to cope with additional 
population. On both counts, the low-income developing countries are strapped by the 
rollercoaster of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
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1.  Standard deviations are calculated from annual percentage growth rates of GDP per capita taken from 
the 2007 World Development Indicators.  
2.  There are 25 high-income OECD countries and 146 other countries in the world under the World Bank 
list of economies (July 2007). See Appendix B for a complete list of countries in the samples. 
 
 
  Average standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rates (%) 
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Mean 3.405 2.760 7.492 4.502 1.250 33,724  15.42 67.42 79.82 87.86 16.86 
St.  Dev.  2.930 1.904 1.512 1.962 2.510 118,649  7.28  169.7 42.43 280.4 6.671 
Min.  0.687 0.046 4.785 1  -7.41 41.6  0.85  -41.3 14.95 -0.97 4.585 
Max. 23.54 6.942 10.40 7  11.08 1,146,983  34.12 2,128 305.7 2,461 52.57 
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1.  Pair-wise correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels of significance. 
2.  Summary statistics and the correlation matrix are calculated from country averages for the time period from 1980 to 2004. 
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3.  Growth volatility is measured by the standard deviation of per annum growth rates of real GDP per capita, in percentage. 
4.  Research output is the (logarithm) number of scientific and technical publications per (million) capita. 
5.  Initial income is the (logarithm) level of real GDP per capita in the first year of the sample periods.  
6.  Initial constraint is constraint on executive power in the first year of the sample periods. It measures the institutional and other constraints that are placed on 
presidents and dictators. It has a scale from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating more constraints. 
7.  GDP growth is the per annum growth rates of real GDP per capita, in percentage. 
8.  Pop. is total population, in thousands of people.  
9.  Manufacture share is the value added of the manufacture sector divided by GDP, in percentage.  
10.  Domestic credit refers to the value of credits provided by banks to the private sector divided by GDP, in percentage. 
11.  Trade share is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, in percentage. 
12.  Govern. expend is government consumption divided by GDP, in percentage. 













































1.  Independent variables are lagged one time period.   
2.  Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and time-correlated robust t-statistics. 
3.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative.  

















Dependent variable is standard deviations of growth rates of real GDP per capita  
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1.  All regressions include unreported country and time fixed effects. 
2.  Independent variables are lagged one time period. 
3.  Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity and time-correlated robust t-statistics. 
4.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative. 
5.  Detailed descriptions of data series and sources are provided in Appendix A.   
























Dependent variable is standard deviations of growth rates of real GDP per capita  
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33 





















1.  t STD Δ  denotes first-differencing of growth volatility between time t  and  1 − t , whereas  1 − Δ t ROP  denotes first-differencing of research output between 
time  1 − t  and  2 − t .  
2.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative. 
3.  Detailed descriptions of data series and sources are provided in Appendix A.   
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1.  t STD Δ  denotes first-differencing of growth volatility between time t  and  1 − t , whereas  1 − Δ t ROP  denotes first-differencing of research output between 
time  1 − t  and  2 − t . 
2.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative. 
3.  Detailed descriptions of data series and sources are provided in Appendix A.   
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1.  1 − Δ t STD ,  1 − Δ t ROP ,  1 − Δ t IY ,  1 − Δ t POP ,  1 − Δ t FIN ,  1 − Δ t GR , and  1 − Δ t INF  denote, respectively, first differencing of growth volatility, research output, 
initial income, population, financial development, growth and inflation between time  1 − t  and  2 − t . 
2.  All regressions include unreported country and time fixed effects. 
3.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative.  
4.  Detailed descriptions of data series and sources are provided in Appendix A.  
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1.  1 − Δ t STD ,  1 − Δ t ROP ,  1 − Δ t IY ,  1 − Δ t POP ,  1 − Δ t FIN ,  1 − Δ t GR , and  1 − Δ t INF  denote, respectively, first differencing of growth volatility, research output, 
initial income, population, financial development, growth and inflation between time  1 − t  and  2 − t . 
2.  All regressions include unreported country and time fixed effects. 
3.  The results are statistically significant at the one (***), five (**) and ten (*) percent levels, against a two-sided alterative.  
4.  Detailed descriptions of data series and sources are provided in Appendix A.  
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Appendix A: Data and Sources 
 
1.  Growth volatility for each economy is measured by the standard deviation of per 
annum growth rates of real GDP per capita, in percentage over the panel sample 
periods 1980-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, and 2000-04. Data on GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$) are taken from 2007 World Development Indicators. 
2.  Research output is the (logarithm) number of scientific and engineering (S&E) 
publications per (million) capita. S&E articles, notes, and reviews published in a set 
of the world’s most influential scientific and technical journals tracked by Thompson 
ISI in the Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). 
The number of journals covered by SCI/SSCI in 2003 was 5,315. The coverage 
extends to electronic journals, including print journals with electronic versions and 
electronic-only journals. Articles are attributed to countries by the author’s 
institutional affiliation at the time of publication. Credit for an article with authors 
from more than one institution or country is divided among the collaborating 
institutions or countries based on the proportion of their participating department or 
institutions. Data are prepared by National Science Foundation and are available from 
2007 World Development Indicators. Observations are averages over the panel 
sample periods.  
3.  Initial income is the (logarithm) level of real GDP per capita in the first year of each 
panel sample period. Data on GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) are taken from 
2007 World Development Indicators. 
4.  Executive constraint is constraint on executive power in the first year of each panel 
sample period. It measures the institutional and other constraints that are placed on 
presidents and dictators. It has a scale from 1 to 7, with higher scores indicating more 
constraints. Score of 1 indicates unlimited authority; score of 3 indicates slight to 
moderate limitations; score of 5 indicates substantial limitations; score of 7 indicates 
executive parity or subordination. Scores of 2, 4 and 6 indicate intermediate values. 
Data are taken from Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2004 prepared by Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Center for 
Global Policy, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
5.  GDP growth is per annum growth rate of real GDP per capita, in percentage. 
Observations are averages over the panel sample periods. Data are taken from 2007 
World Development Indicators. 
6.  Population is the average total population in logarithm over the panel sample periods. 
Data are taken from 2007 World Development Indicators. 
7.  Manufacturing share is the value added of the manufacturing sector divided by GDP, 
in percentage. Observations are averages over the panel sample periods. Raw data are 
taken from 2007 World Development Indicators. 
8.  Financial development is measured by domestic credit. It refers to the value of credits 
provided by financial intermediaries (banks and non-banks) to the private sector 
divided by GDP, in percentage. Observations are averages over the panel sample 
periods. Raw data are taken from 2007 World Development Indicators. 
9.  Trade share is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, in percentage. 
Observations are averages over the panel sample periods. Raw data are taken from 
2007 World Development Indicators. 
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10. Inflation is the annual percentage change in GDP deflator. Observations are averages 
over the panel sample periods. Data are taken from 2007 World Development 
Indicators. 
11. Government expenditure is government consumption divided by GDP, in percentage. 
Observations are averages of the panel sample periods. Raw data are taken from 2007 
































 Appendix B: Key Country Data 
 























Albania  9.1 3.2  M  3124  32.4 1.0  33.6 
Algeria 1.6  5.4  M 27265 56.4  0.1 15.2 
Angola 6.3  0.1  M 11173 3.0  -0.7  787.3 
Antigua  2.9 2.2  H  68  66.7 3.8 4.2 
Argentina 5.3  55.7  M 33277 38.6  0.3  317.6 
Armenia 3.4  49.1  M 3186 19.4  1.7  527.2 
Australia 1.2  676.7  OECD,  H  17329  68.1  2.0  4.5 
Austria  1.1 406.0  OECD,  H  7804 114.1  1.9  2.7 
Azerbaijan 7.5  14.0  M  7740  25.4  -2.2  314.5 
Bahamas  2.5 6.0  H  262  63.9 0.2 3.5 
Bahrain 2.3  66.3  H  519  28.7  1.2  -0.7 
Bangladesh  0.9 1.2  L  114336  29.0 2.3 5.3 
Belarus 5.0  57.5  M  10074  26.6  1.1  450.9 
Belgium  1.2 458.5  OECD,  H  10057 100.2  1.8  3.0 
Belize  3.9 8.0  M  199  44.8 3.7 2.2 
Benin  0.8 1.8  L  5550  17.2 0.2 4.7 
Bhutan 1.7  2.3  M 522 4.6 4.8 9.7 
Bolivia 1.4  2.5  M 6953 35.8  0.7  847.6 
Bosnia 16.8  1.8  M 3715 N/A N/A  N/A
Botswana 2.1  23.4  M 1543 -41.3  5.5  10.1 
Brazil 2.5  23.7  M 152318 89.5  0.7  461.2 
Brunei 1.9  25.9  H  267  N/A  -1.9  -1.0 
Bulgaria 3.7  119.5  M  8513  38.0  1.9  65.3 
Burkina  Faso  2.7 1.9  L  9011 9.9 1.2 2.9 
Burundi 4.1  1.2  L  5742  23.9  -1.2  9.0 
Cambodia  2.3 0.2  L  11018 5.8 5.2 0.9 
Cameroon 0.9  5.0  M  12942  20.6  -1.1  3.7 
Canada  1.5 747.2  OECD,  H  28216 120.1  1.6  3.5 
Cape  Verde  2.5 0.9  M  372  44.3 2.8 4.9 
C.A.R. 4.0  2.0  L  3151  12.9  -1.1  5.0 
Chad  8.7 0.2  L  6427  13.5 0.8 3.1 
Chile 2.4  63.1  M  13588  87.6  3.5  13.6 
China  2.9 8.2  M  1146983  93.1 8.5 5.7 
Colombia  2.0 5.1  M  37936  33.7 1.4  19.9 
Comoros 3.4  0.5  L  434  17.3  -0.9  4.0 
Congo B.  2.8  4.8  M  2635  24.3  -2.9  3.8 
Congo Kinshasa  3.7  0.6  L  40115  8.2  -6.0  2460.7 
Costa Rica  2.4  19.9  M  3413  27.6  2.2  15.0 
Croatia 2.4  125.9  M  4525  60.2  0.5  192.6 
Cyprus 2.0  65.7  H  637  137.1  3.0  4.0 
Czech Republic  2.0  254.6  OECD, H  10284  61.7  1.0  11.1 
Denmark 1.3  779.9  OECD,  H  5211  76.7  1.6  3.9 
Djibouti 1.8  1.9  M  579  48.4  -4.4  4.2 
Dominica  2.7 2.8  M  72  59.6 3.4 4.3 
Dominican  Rep  3.3 0.9  M  7589  31.7 2.3  21.0 
Ecuador  2.6 0.0  M  445552  27.9 0.1 1.2 
Egypt 1.3  22.1  M  57437  100.8  2.7  10.5 
El  Salvador  1.2 0.4  M  5321  36.8 1.9 4.7 
Eq. Guinea  15.4  1.9  M  365  28.6  11.1  8.2 
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Eritrea  6.3 0.4  L  3118  N/A 9.7 5.7 
Estonia 4.1  127.9  H  1456  24.4  2.1  63.8 
Ethiopia  7.5 1.5  L  55901  38.4 0.3 6.0 
Fiji 2.8  21.1  M  742  39.2  1.6  4.3 
Finland 1.9  712.9  OECD,  H  5027  64.8  2.2  4.2 
France  1.1 443.4  OECD,  H  56996 103.0  1.7  3.7 
Gabon 3.7  14.5  M  1015  23.2  -1.3  3.8 
Gambia 2.5  8.8  L  995  13.3  -0.5  11.7 
Georgia 6.3  17.9  M  5042  8.3  -2.5  1157.3 
Germany  1.3 432.4  OECD,  H  80197 115.8  1.7  2.2 
Ghana  0.8 3.6  L  17281  24.6 1.9  27.4 
Greece 1.5  182.6  OECD,  H  10371  91.4  1.4  13.0 
Grenada  4.0 3.5  M  95  65.8 4.0 3.7 
Guatemala  0.7 2.1  M  9256  29.0 1.1  16.0 
Guinea  0.9 0.4  L  6580 6.0 1.1  16.4 
Guinea-Bissau 7.7  1.6  L  1083  21.0  -0.4  52.3 
Guyana  3.5 6.9  M  733  217.4 2.9  35.7 
Haiti 3.8  0.4  L  6999  31.2  -2.5  17.1 
Honduras  2.4 1.1  M  5105  36.5 0.2  14.5 
Hong  Kong  3.7 135.2  H  5731 130.4  4.0  7.1 
Hungary 2.3  194.7  M  10392  83.4  1.7  13.3 
Iceland 2.8  417.6  OECD,  H  259  63.4  1.9  18.0 
India 2.1  11.9  L  875943  50.9  3.8  7.7 
Indonesia  2.9 0.7  M  189428  45.8 3.5  12.8 
Iran  3.0 8.3  M  57359  56.0 1.3  22.5 
Ireland 2.0  302.1  OECD,  H  3627  72.3  4.5  5.5 
Israel 2.0  1033.4  H  5104  112.6  1.7  56.6 
Italy 1.1  265.7  OECD,  H  56818  91.6  1.7  7.1 
Ivory Coast  1.7  2.8  L  13119  36.9  -0.8  4.5 
Jamaica 1.8  24.4  M  2427  45.4  1.9  23.7 
Japan  1.4 338.7  OECD,  H  123447 262.8  2.0  0.9 
Jordan 3.2  47.6  M  3862  98.1  0.1  3.7 
Kazakhstan  3.1 8.8  M  15439  20.8 0.5  383.0 
Kenya 1.5  10.9  L  24408  45.5  0.0  11.0 
Kiribati  3.3 2.0  M  76  N/A 1.3 3.1 
Korea South  2.7  92.9  OECD, H  43372  71.1  5.6  6.8 
Kuwait 4.0  122.0  H  1957  97.7  0.1  5.6 
Kyrgyzstan 5.9  1.8  L  4427  N/A  -1.6  137.6 
Laos  1.1 0.2  L  4322 8.8 2.8  36.8 
Latvia 5.5  44.8  M  2497  18.1  1.6  64.3 
Lebanon 5.5  28.8  M  3390  53.2  -6.3  31.5 
Lesotho  2.7 2.5  M  1618  11.6 3.1  11.8 
Liberia 23.5  1.3  M  2226  453.6  -4.3  255.3 
Lithuania 3.0  59.3  M  3574  17.1  -0.2  134.1 
Luxembourg 2.6  57.8  OECD,  H  399  89.5  3.6  3.3 
Macedonia 2.1  19.5  M  1975  52.1  -1.1  166.3 
Malawi  6.6 3.0  L  9358  22.8 0.2  26.1 
Malaysia 2.9  17.2  M  19945  175.7  3.6  2.8 
Mali  3.1 1.1  L  9365  15.6 0.4 4.4 
Malta 1.7  30.3  H  366  97.6  4.4  2.7 
Marshall IS  4.0  19.0  M  45  N/A  0.0  3.8 
Mauritania  3.5 0.8  L  2134  29.7 0.3 9.1 
Mauritius  0.8 5.5  M  1083  61.8 5.0 8.1 
Mexico 2.7  20.1  M  84948  44.0  1.0  36.8 
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Micronesia 3.5  8.2  M 99 N/A -0.1  3.1 
Moldova 5.6  18.1  M 4260 24.2 -2.4  162.4 
Morocco 4.4  9.7  M 26067 73.8  1.9  3.5 
Mozambique  4.7 0.6  L  14637  2127.6 3.4  45.2 
Namibia 2.2  6.1  M  1472  43.9  -0.1  11.7 
Nepal  1.9 1.2  L  20083  31.8 2.4  10.2 
Netherlands  1.1 668.3  OECD,  H  15156 122.3  1.7  2.4 
New Zealand  1.6  656.2  OECD, H  3539  76.4  1.5  5.7 
Nicaragua 1.6  1.6  M  4116  122.0  -1.6  1934.3 
Niger 3.8  1.9  L  8997  13.9  -0.5  2.2 
Nigeria 2.8  6.1  L  101699  27.5  -0.1  22.7 
Norway 1.3  601.9  OECD,  H  4305  79.5  2.5  4.7 
Oman 2.1  26.9  M  2049  28.0  1.7  1.8 
Pakistan  1.8 2.3  L  120134  49.4 2.1 8.9 
Panama 2.5  12.3  M  2754  65.7  1.3  2.3 
P.N.G. 5.2  10.4  L  4328  31.8  1.6  5.3 
Paraguay 2.1  1.4  M 4390 24.4  0.3 19.5 
Peru 3.6  3.1  M 23357 19.6  0.6  552.0 
Philippines 1.8  2.3  M 66932 50.4  1.0  8.4 
Poland 1.5  127.5  M 38368 33.2  3.4 20.6 
Portugal 1.7  95.4  OECD,  H  10031  97.1  2.4  10.6 
Romania 4.4  30.7  M 22570 42.4  0.2 62.6 
Russia 3.5  83.2  M 146586 21.8 -0.8  215.3 
Rwanda 14.2  1.3  M 6306 14.5  0.4  9.9 
Samoa 2.8  15.5  M 164 8.2 1.0 8.6 
Saudi Arabia  2.5  35.8  H  17544  58.5  -0.4  1.7 
Senegal  1.7 4.9  L  8935  30.0 0.6 3.8 
Seychelles 4.1  19.9  M  73  63.9  4.1  2.5 
Sierra Leone  8.8  2.0  L  4024  41.3  -4.6  60.0 
Singapore 3.7  330.4  H  3281  83.2  4.5  2.1 
Slovakia 3.1  100.8  M  5275  34.0  1.4  8.2 
Slovenia 1.1  295.3  H  1988  38.3  2.1  36.2 
Solomon  Islands  5.3 8.5  L  330  33.6 1.5 9.8 
South Africa  1.6  61.9  M  36651  119.5  0.0  12.2 
Spain  1.3 229.1  OECD,  H  39270 106.4  2.3  6.6 
Sri Lanka  1.3  5.1  M 17632 39.5  3.3  9.0 
St. Kitts  3.2  1.6  M 42 88.2  5.9  4.5 
St. Lucia  5.1  8.7  M 137 65.6  3.9  3.1 
St. Vincent  3.1  1.2  M 110 57.2  3.1  4.1 
Sudan  1.9 2.4  L  27202  18.0 2.1  62.5 
Suriname 3.2  5.4  M 405 78.8 -0.1 75.1 
Swaziland 1.3  6.8  M 816 15.4  2.4 11.7 
Sweden  1.3 962.8  OECD,  H  8632 110.6  1.7  4.8 
Switzerland  1.4 959.6  OECD,  H  6822 163.4  1.0  2.3 
Syria  2.4 3.1  M  14353  51.2 1.2  11.0 
Tajikistan 7.2  3.0  L  5436  N/A  -7.4  204.8 
Tanzania 1.3  3.0  M 29404 20.2  1.1 18.2 
Thailand 3.1  8.0  M 57110 120.0  4.9  3.6 
Togo 6.3  1.4  L  4137  23.6  -0.2  5.3 
Tonga  2.6 6.7  M  94  38.0 1.6 6.4 
Trinidad 2.6  36.5  H  1230  58.5  0.1  5.2 
Tunisia 1.9  22.0  M  8707  69.5  2.5  4.4 
Turkey 4.6  31.0  M  57734  38.0  2.1  56.7 
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